

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

ROLES OF ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

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The September 11, 2001 attacks were interpreted in different ways by individual countries and/or regional and international organizations. Many states pledged their willingness to take part in countering measures against terrorism. NATO invoked Article V, collective defense provision for the first time in its history, and other international organizations express their decision to participate within the common effort to support the campaign against terrorism. Starting in 2002, the first deployment of Romanian troops, for example, to join the Coalition Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan, has represented a fundamental pace in the Eastern European countries' way to become members of NATO. Since that year, small and middle countries have adopted a new system of values through their desire to join the club of democracy and freedom.

The conflict's dimension has been modified radically in recent years through the asymmetric characteristics of confrontations. Depending on the new geopolitics and geostrategic developments, I intend to review and determine the roles of alliances and coalitions in this environment. In addition, from the perspectives of the new international environmental challenges, the growing roll of international organizations and regional arrangements, I analyze the necessity of common values, norms and rules for its kind of organizations.

ROLES OF ALLIANCES AND COALITIONS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM

In the international context, a state's security is not considered to be threatened by major military conflicts anymore. After World War II, the international community had to reinstall peace in numerous locations all over the world.¹ In this respect, military power, as one of the main components of national power, is manning the ramparts of freedom around the world.² Our world, therefore, does not have peaceful stability; rather it has a relative stability, one which is unpredictable and susceptible to new conflicts: the rise of Non-Trinitarian War.³ In the sixteen years following the end of the Cold War,⁴ conflicts have proliferated and do not seem to be under control, then other types of power which represents states or entities, and non-states actors.⁵ These actors have developed their own capacities in a relatively thin and limited domain, but these capacities nevertheless provide them the possibilities to start and support "hot spots" of crises and conflicts, and influence, as a result, the security environment. Even though all this is reflected in the news media, specifically publications, books, and governments' studies, we must, however, still add the most spectacular acts and the most dangerous organizations: terrorists.

Terrorism as Transnational Network in a New Global Environment

As the 19th century ended, it seemed that no one was safe from terrorist attacks.⁶ During the late and early 20th centuries, in addition to anarchist and socialist networks, a number of nationalist movements could be considered as transnationally organized. This model continued throughout the 20th century in the form of transnational organized anti-imperial, anti-colonial and separatist nationalist movements, all of which used strategies of terror and violence.⁷ In the beginning of 21st century, the sudden and dramatic terrorist acts and bombings in the United States, Spain, Russia, and United Kingdom created a general sense of understanding that no political or ideologically-driven organization can survive and thrive without a support network.⁸ Researching the historical events and features of terrorism is not the aim of this paper; however, stating that terrorism has evolved throughout modern history is nevertheless appropriate.⁹

Acts of terrorism carried out by any organization at any time and place¹⁰ have emotionally impacted populations and political decisions. As was the case in many situations through mass-media coverage,¹¹ the terrorist outrage produced significant impacts on some of the larger actors which are part in the regional and global equations of power. Subsequently, through the use of unconventional and asymmetrical means and procedures, the terrorist organizations and the states which supported them surprised¹² the governmental structures in charge with states'

security. A new concept consequently became acceptable among international players to engage themselves in the struggle with this scourge: *the military intervention – with or without a United Nations (UN) mandate – for preventing and combating terrorism*. While “thinking out of the box,” however, we should not consider this to be only a military issue.

We must fight terrorist networks, and all those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, using every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of success – some seen, some unseen. And we will always remain vigilant against new terrorist threats.¹³

The newly developing pattern of terrorism, targeting forces of modernization and globalization specifically embodied by the United States and its allies, had been characterized by unprecedented violence. Its members must be eradicated. The history of terrorism and counterterrorism indicated, however, that those questionable movements are not associated with the current phase of radical religious, anti-American, anti-Western venom and may be deserving of a more careful analysis and a more discriminating response.

Today, the world has been confronted as never before by terrorism. While terrorism is considered to play a broader role in the international arena, world powers must consider that terrorism remains a widely debated element of international affairs. The world's nations remain unable even to agree on its definition.¹⁴ Furthermore, terrorism has many forms.¹⁵ By analyzing transnational terrorism within the broader context of a new global environment, world powers need to think about what would constitute an appropriate long-term political response to this broader phenomenon, and this is not an easy task.¹⁶ The complexity of transnational terrorism presents a conceptual challenge to the discipline of military strategy, which has traditionally been concerned with understanding conflict among state actors, rather than the role that non-state actors play in the international security environment. Yet, international terrorism is normally an international phenomenon that impacts overall levels of international security and international stability. Consequently, open and pluralist societies are now confronted in fundamental ways, as they were confronted by the communism ideology.¹⁷ In this respect it is quite easy to assume that terrorists seek to undermine the security and prosperity of nations and that they feel threatened by the values and aspirations which make modern countries open, tolerant, and creative societies with confident futures.

Supposing that this analysis is close to the actual reality, one has to assume that global efforts are necessary to adjust to a threat that is not only alien but also unconventional and unpredictable. Moreover, its presence is largely unseen and unknown. To seek to protect and

defend world countries with the knowledge that there are no guarantees for preventing successful attacks in democratic societies is indeed challenging. This is, as many scholars assume, an asymmetric threat with disproportionate advantages to the smaller but determined aggressors operating beyond any accepted rules of behavior.

An interdependent and globalized world facilitates transmission of terror to remote victims. Borders and distance do not offer much protection from a terrorist organization that is proficient at using technology to recruit, communicate, and operate transnationally. With more extensive international interests than ever before, it is necessary to increase the common efforts within international partners to protect the values shared not only by the western countries, but also by the developing countries as well. Since economies are linked to the global system that is exposed to terrorist sabotage,¹⁸ one must consequently adapt to living in a more dangerous world. These new terrorists have used aircraft as weapons. They have used public transport to indiscriminately kill innocent people. They have made bombs from materials used in kitchens, farming, mining, and so many other things which seem to be bought from Wal-Mart. Moreover, they have experimented with chemical and biological weapons, and these terrorists are limited only by imagination and opportunity.

There is no doubt that the global community has to face a new international order. As Thomas Barnett assumes, "the global conflict between the forces of connectedness and disconnectedness is here and is not going away anytime soon."¹⁹ In this respect the world must adapt to these harsh new realities in a constantly changing strategic environment. Some scholars assume that all these changes began with the end of the Cold War and the new strategic uncertainties that followed. In Europe, for example, the altered situation in the Balkans region has created a fertile environment for organized crime, human trafficking, and any other criminal activities associated with terrorism, right in Old Europe. Further more, the continuing degradation of security and stability situations in the Middle East and Central Asia, in conjunction with the growing levels of poverty, have contributed as much as possible to a favorable framework for conducting deadly terrorist acts. Looking back to September 11, 2001, it is mandatory to recognize that the people who planned, organized, and conducted those horrible acts, had a totally different view and vision (if that can be called vision) about the future. This problem should not be considered just a problem for United States to solve. Consequently, the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent military and economic power should be considered since it, along with its allies and partners, remains the overwhelmingly dominant factor in the global strategic balance today. As is specified within the United States Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

We will also be resourceful. This strategy relies upon the ingenuity, innovation, and strength of the American people. We will rally others to this common cause. We will not only forge a diverse and powerful coalition to combat terrorism today, but work with our international partners to build lasting mechanisms for combating terrorism and for coordination and cooperation.²⁰

The balance the United States struck with other dominant world powers has brought advantages and opportunities for smaller and less dominant countries, like Romania, to openly commit to the benefits of international cooperation in an increasingly globalized world. On the other hand, as mentioned previously in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, world leaders must address the possibility that these transnational terrorists may acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear capability. This prospect presents dangers of grave proportions and remains a key factor in American strategic policy, and for NATO members and coalition members who fight in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, and other key partners alike.

The transnational terrorist capacity to inflict harm, without restraint or warning, means the international community's response must be on a large spectrum in accordance with the existing and predictable challenges. It has demanded adjustment to a new cast on the broader security policies, including the approaches to other transnational issues such as people smuggling, money laundering and organized crime. They are not only involved in violence, but they also provide social services, such as welfare, policing, education, employment, membership, identity and existential meanings to constituencies that are marginalized within the given political order. Contemporary political science has largely relegated participation in non-state organizations as belonging to the realm of civil society, but this misses the fact that transnationally organized movements may have an international agenda, rather than simply an organization agenda, and/or view themselves as directly challenging the interests and identities of existing state interests.²¹

The international community's counter-terrorism response has meant changes to the environment in which normal people lead their everyday lives. Protection against terrorism is essential to preserving the right of each country, of each person, for security. This allows people to participate freely in a society based on shared values of freedom and respect for the dignity of human life. It is necessary to recognize this and to make sure the inevitable cost of preparedness does not also tax cultural values, tolerance and the fundamental way of life.²²

The United States, however, should not be the only world power involved with defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending against terrorism.²³ States, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and any other structures and/or entities, should unify all their efforts and capabilities to face the very complex terrorism challenge. It is obviously clear

and sustained by many strategies, policies, ideologies, and so forth that only an integrated counterterrorism international program will enable targeted governments to identify and systematically neutralize the strategies of terrorist organizations. The next section of this paper will explore the United Nations' measures which have been taken in order to argue the need for coordination by this organization.

The Need of United Nations for Combating Terrorism

Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict.²⁴

The above extract belongs to a United Nations report which suggests how nations can work together to meet the new challenges of the 21st century. The report also assesses the current threats to international peace and security and evaluates how well the existing policies and institutions are doing in addressing those threats. It is obvious that the report argues that the UN, as the largest international organization, can no longer afford to view problems such as terrorism, civil wars, or extreme poverty, in isolation. The UN report also suggests, that the organization's strategies must be comprehensive, and that all institutions must overcome their preoccupations and learn to work across the whole range of issues in a concerted pattern.

The United Nations has focused and engaged its entire means available, even though there are not too many and these are not very effective, to sustain and legitimize the international community's measures to combat the scourge of terrorism. Between 1963 and 1999, the international community elaborated twelve universal legal instruments on the prevention and suppression of terrorism. Since 1999, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been addressing, for many years, issues pertaining to international terrorism and international cooperation. In 2002, the General Assembly approved an expanded program of activities for the Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) within the Division for Treaty Affairs of UNODC.²⁵ The TPB is focusing on the provision of assistance to countries, upon request, for ratifying and implementing the twelve universal legal instruments against terrorism.²⁶ It is clear that the TPB seems to provide a prompt and efficient process to answer the requests from countries for assistance in countering terrorism, in accordance with its mandate. This program presents a realm to provide legal advice to countries on becoming instrumental in combating terrorism by assisting countries to incorporate these provisions into their national penal codes, by providing training to criminal justice officials on the new laws, and by providing assistance to strengthen national institutions dealing with terrorism.

While examining and investigating in depth the TPB's program itself, its influence in the management of new challenges could never reach its intended scope. In this very complex, vulnerable, uncertain, and ambiguous global arena, the UN should demonstrate its maturity in order to make an evident and clear expression of globalization policy. In other words, the UN must gather all its members to work together in order to avoid the consequences of isolationism, and, as a mandatory request, to reunite all nations' efforts to sustain the nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). While illuminating this last aspect the UN must take very seriously its role within the global fight against terrorism, by providing and proving its value as a tool which is able to fulfill the will of free and innocent people. Consequently, the UN should provide the best and the strongest example – either for state or non-state actors within the international arena – in the field of how to approach the war against terrorist organizations and their horrible acts.

Many efforts are made to maximize impact through operational partnerships and to avoid duplication of efforts. Furthermore, technical assistance activities are undertaken in close partnership and cooperation with numerous international, regional and sub-regional organizations.²⁷ It is clear that terrorist threats imposed upon the UN charter to respond actively and effectively to new challenges today and tomorrow. Even now the organization is not able to get involved in the field of combating terrorism; however, the UN should approach these new threats directly by involving the entire international community and showing the commitment of all its members to fight against terrorists. These efforts act as an important catalyst to facilitate the UN's role in these actions, as, for example, an on-going operational plan or project, with global, sub-regional and national components and activities. The goals, motivations and patterns of interaction with the UN and these actors are indeed quite distinctive. The UN will have to consider under which circumstances it is possible or desirable to hand over a mandate for action to one of the potential partners. So far, the best partners available within this huge organization are considered to be the regional and sub-regional organizations, but in accordance with globalization, there are to be taken into consideration other international actors such as non-governmental and international organization, corporations, and foundations.

Given that a number of relevant organizations and entities, both internal and external to the UN, are involved in the prevention and combat of terrorism, an integrated and coordinated response to terrorism will serve to increase complementarities, avoid duplication of efforts and resources, increase cost effectiveness, and broaden the audience that each entity can reach individually. As a result, the TPB is committed to building partnerships with relevant entities on a number of levels.²⁸ Beyond all these assumptions regarding TPB's importance and relevance,

this organization has to play a key role in the global approach to define and apply the counter-terrorism measures which should cover more than that. It must refer also to the social, political, and economical development of those countries which are considered to be the cradle of the new generation of terrorists.

Within the UN, however, it is vital to realize the importance of sustaining counter-terrorism measures through structural measures, fated to contribute to the economical and social development, as well as to the strengthening of the democratic system. It is also vital for the UN to become much more involved in adopting such kinds of measures by which disasters and emergency situations, which have resulted from terrorist acts, are to be stabilized and solved through the coordination of all efforts made by the international community.

As mentioned previously, the UN does not have the means available either to sustain and legitimize the international community's measures to combat the terrorism scourge or to implement and control all those measures described in the previous paragraph. Consequently, conventional wisdom, reflected in many studies and thoughts, considers that the unilateral power itself is not enough to succeed in combating not only terrorism but all disasters and other criminal activities. Therefore, the *use of alliances and arranging coalitions*²⁹ are to be the main tools in controlling, defeating and stabilizing all kinds of bad situations. In conclusion, although individual and/or collective state actors' and/or international organizations' efforts to maintain regional and global stability and security are based upon soft power,³⁰ which increasingly seems to yield positive results, military instruments (in their form of extreme manifestation) often remain the final solution. Subsequently, in the next section NATO, as a representative political-military alliance, will be analyzed in regards to its role and effectiveness in the war against terrorism.

NATO Strategy for Combating Terrorism

In the early 1990s, new states had been created in the Central-Eastern part of Europe. A decade later, the global era of counterterrorism emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Pennsylvania. These acts fundamentally changed the primary threats to international security and redefined the concept of security for all states. On September 12, 2001, the member states of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) unconditionally condemned the terrorist attacks on the United States of America and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism.³¹

Beginning with the assumption that an alliance's legitimacy relies on its capacities and capabilities to provide collective defense for all its members in an international arena, the current relevance of this type of organization can only be drawn from an analysis of how it

serves to deter common threats today. Searching for NATO strategy against terrorism, I couldn't find it, but I found instead the NATO Concept for Defense against Terrorism.³²

Analyzing the NATO concept for Defense Against Terrorism, it is a broad spectrum of measures for combating the current threats. In particular it looks at those threats posed by international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and rising states perceived to have the potential to upset today's balance of power, such as the People's Republic of China, India, Brazil, and it provides an effective framework to set up a provisional strategy for combating terrorism. Its analysis starts by assuming that NATO does not yet have a strategy and that because of this, it is difficult to come to any sort of international consensus regarding the relevant strategy of the alliance today because national interests, threat perceptions, and concepts of collective security remain disparate even after the September 11 attacks.³³

Consequently, is important for the alliance itself and the global community as well to show the commitment to this organization by combating the worst scourge of the beginning of the third millennium. To accomplish such an objective, it is mandatory to have a NATO strategy approved after reaching a consensus with all the alliance's members. This will provide legitimacy and reliability for any action which has to be taken and will reduce the decision-making time according to the characteristics of new terrorists acts.

A. Scope of the Strategy.

After September 11, 2001, the fight against international terrorism reached unprecedented proportions and now also covers a broad spectrum of new areas. Many measures³⁴ – on a global, regional and individual scale – strongly suggest that a strategy for combating terrorism is also an important element in the joint efforts of the alliance to control and defeat these criminal acts, as is the assessment of the use of weapons of mass destruction and the identification of ways of combating them. Clearly it is impossible for one country alone to deal with all these aspects in depth.³⁵ Furthermore, internal cooperation and the general consensus within the alliance is imperative to determine a clear and reliable strategy for combating terrorism on a global scale. Moreover, looking and searching within other international actors' measures, almost all international organizations have set up more working groups and other committees to tackle some aspect of terrorism.

NATO is a collective defensive mechanism, so an attack against any single member of NATO automatically constitutes an attack against all member states and requires a reaction from all members in the form of collective action. Illustrating this, Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty emphasizes that the core mission of NATO is the collective defense of its members.³⁶ Some NATO members, including the United Kingdom and Germany, have assisted the United States in military actions to remove the Taliban regime from Afghanistan. After that NATO, as a whole, has continued to assist in leading a UN-mandated mission, especially within Kabul, but the organization itself has not been able to react in any way to the terrorist attacks against the alliance's members which have occurred first in Madrid and then in London. Those horrible attacks have resulted in the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Consequently, these kinds of issues are momentous and can undermine the alliance's unity and relevance. NATO needs a clear *Strategy for Combating Terrorism* based upon the NATO Treaty and Partner Action Plan against Terrorism,³⁷ in order to defend all its members and partnership countries against terrorist attacks and preserve the peace by building good relations among other international, governmental and/or non-governmental organizations.

B. Objectives, Ways and Means.

The alliance's objectives can be derived from the first articles of the NATO Treaty.³⁸ But these have been created primarily to deter and defend against Cold War threats. Then, on the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary in April 1999, its 19 members approved the "Strategic Concept of the Alliance." This agreement has effectively redefined the mission of the alliance as one that dedicates it to responding to a broad spectrum of threats.³⁹ Consequently, this policy transforms the alliance to place greater importance on political dimensions and to expand its geographical focus beyond NATO territory. In addition, NATO has an open door policy on enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance when invited to do so by the existing member countries.⁴⁰

For the past eleven years, NATO has promoted military and political interoperability across the European continent through the Partnership for Peace and EAPC. It is clear that NATO wants to continue to engage other new countries by offering them cooperation to face the new security and stability challenges which are threatening the alliance itself and its members as well. Beyond Europe, the alliance is focusing primarily upon the Caucasus and Central Asia as regions which have enormous strategic importance, but regions which also face serious endemic problems, including terrorism. NATO will continue to keep its doors open for the next enlargement, not just as a simple option, but for increasingly unifying efforts for combating terrorism, considered among all the alliance's members as a major threat to regional and global stability and security. To face these challenges, the alliance's leadership must develop new

strategies, new ways of cooperation, and new instruments according to its profound transformation which occurred in the beginning of the third millennium. It is a challenge which encompasses both the relevance as well as the reliability of the Alliance itself. In accordance with the Partner Action Plan against Terrorism, the EAPC has established the main objectives for combating terrorism,⁴¹ but based upon the analysis at the evolution of the regional and global security environment I propose the following objectives:

1. NATO must secure the alliance as a whole and its individual members from direct terrorist attacks. The Alliance will call for all of its members and other actors from the international arena to defend the fundamental values of civilized societies.

2. NATO must increase the alliance's strength and partnership. NATO should continue to build a successful political and military system in a free and democratic world. It is to be seen in a practical field, within the alliance and outside as well, in the light of its essential values which support and preserve NATO's integrity.

3. NATO should build a stabile and favorable security environment. Beyond affirming its values, the organization should foster changes in the nature of the terrorism system. The enlargement policy will create conditions for a favorable international system by demonstrating the alliance's resolve and commitment to working with other nations to identify terrorists and the best means to defeat them:

In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defense enhances the security environment of the Alliance. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives.⁴²

Although the above excerpt from The Alliance's Strategic Concept was written prior to September 11, 2001, it provides the framework for the wide variety of challenges faced by NATO in providing the full spectrum of power in its approach to security in the 21st Century. In that strategic concept the alliance has adequately described the objectives, ways and means to accomplish them. Analyzing the specific action items which are contained within the Action Plan demonstrates the effectiveness and validity of the above objectives and implemented as follows:

- *Intensify Consultations and Information Sharing*. This will provide a broad realm for its members to work through political consultation, information sharing, scientific cooperation in identifying and mitigating new threats and challenges to security.⁴³ All

of these will contribute to fulfill the alliance's commitment and help the fight against terrorism.

- *Enhance Preparedness for Combating Terrorism.* In pursuit of its goals the alliance and its partners through their common efforts against terrorism will focus on: defense and security sector reform, force planning, air defense and air traffic management, information exchange about forces, training and exercises, armaments cooperation and logistics cooperation.⁴⁴ All these facts will enhance the ability of the alliance as a whole and of each of its members and partners to develop plans for alerting, containing, coordinating, and responding rapidly to any kind of terrorist attacks.
- *Impede Support for Terrorist Groups.* NATO and its partners must develop mechanisms, techniques, and procedures which will eradicate terrorism wherever it has roots. In this respect, the alliance will focus its efforts on: Border control, the Economic dimension, Arms Control, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Enhance Capabilities to Contribute to Consequence Management (WMD-related terrorism), Enhance co-operation in Civil-Emergency Planning, Military contribution to consequence management, Cooperation in non-classified scientific activities for reducing the impact of terrorism, Cooperation in equipment development and procurement), Assistance to Partners' efforts against terrorism (Use of the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) Clearing House mechanism and Establish/contribute to PfP Trust Funds, Mentoring programs).⁴⁵ The third component of the alliance's ways is comprised of the Action Plan and seeks the collective efforts to diminish conditions that terrorists can exploit.

By accomplishing these objectives, the alliance should continue to expand and coordinate the multilateral efforts on combating terrorism. In particular, I also recommend that it is necessary to broaden the scope and strength of combatant measures. Moreover, NATO should not forget that in this war against terrorism there will be no quick or easy end, and NATO must constantly reassess this to create the architecture to face the challenges of the twenty-first century.

A free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.⁴⁶ Although this statement was written many years ago, it is considered relevant in the present day, especially for multinational organization such as NATO. This organization contributes to the fight against terrorism through military operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Mediterranean and by taking steps to protect its populations and territory against terrorist attacks.⁴⁷ The use of its means in the field is not an easy issue. Because of the lack of a real strategy for combating

terrorism⁴⁸ and an excessive bureaucratic decision process, NATO has not, at least after the Madrid and London terrorist attacks used its full capabilities in the war against terrorism. By its concept for defense against terrorism, the organization has nominated the follow capabilities:

- Effective Intelligence.
- Deployment ability and Readiness. Once it is known where the terrorists are or what they are about to do, military forces need the capability to deploy there. Due to the likelihood that warnings will be received only after a cursory notice, forces need to be at a high state of readiness.
- Effective Engagement. Forces need to be able to engage effectively. This means precision-guided weapons and weapons able to reduce the risk of collateral damage.
- Force Protection. There is a constant requirement for Force Protection to ensure Alliance forces' survivability.
- CBRN Defense.⁴⁹ Given the possible terrorist use of CBRN weapons, CBRN defense equipment needs to be given a high priority.⁵⁰

These capabilities are to be taken into relevant consideration, but as the alliance itself has recognized, there is room for improvements and these are described within the Defense Against Terrorism Program.⁵¹ Applying the alliance's capabilities through waging global war against terrorism should gain acceptance from all members. While there may be members within the NATO organization which are currently reluctant in regard to the field engagement of their forces, all members and the alliance itself should change the approach in applying the use of force in order to support the commitment and will to act decisively to counter the threats represented by this scourge.

C. Threats and Risks.

Threats are well distinguished within NATO's Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism and have been transcribed here from the written assessment:

- Although religious extremism, especially from large numbers of Muslims in NATO countries, is likely to be the source of the most immediate terrorist threats to the Alliance, other motivations for terrorism could emerge from economic, social, demographic and political causes derived from unresolved conflicts or emerging ideologies.
- In addition, although state sponsorship of terrorism is currently in decline, political circumstances could lead to its rise, providing terrorists with safe havens and considerable resources.

- Although the predominant form of terrorist attack remains the creative use of conventional weapons and explosives, terrorist groups are expected to strive for the most destructive means available, including Weapons of Mass Destruction.⁵²

Beyond these threats, emphasizing the existing risks from NATO's serious involvement in the war against terrorism, especially in Iraq, it is crucial that NATO continues its effective results obtained in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Mediterranean. Meanwhile NATO has conducted a restructuring and reforming process. Consequently, if it is not to be overloaded by engaging in a campaign against terrorism, it is possible that some allies will not agree. If all members agree to engage their capabilities into the war, however, then NATO may expect terrorists to conduct attacks against one and/or more countries. Consequently, as happened with the withdrawal of Spanish troops after Madrid's horrible attacks, it is possible to affect the consensus and unity of the alliance.⁵³

Last, but not least, it is important to underline, as a major risk, the fact that not placing enough importance on the expected reactions after terrorist attacks, as happened after the Madrid and London attacks, demonstrates the alliance's weaknesses and subsequently encourages terrorism in order to determine and influence the organization's unity of action and efforts.

All the above should not be taken into consideration as permanent conditions. They are, however, to be adapted and considered in accordance with the evolution of real facts within the international arena, while at the same time taking into consideration not only the state actors but the non-state actors, agencies, and other international factors which are going to influence the regional and global environment. In short, clarifying and covering all threats and risks, proves difficult but necessary in order to analyze possible conclusions and recommendations.

D. Conclusions and Recommendations

A comprehensive and decisive strategy for combating terrorism and winning the peace by NATO should be designed as clearly, effectively and proactively, as possible so that it can be sustained for as long as necessary in order to achieve the goal of defeating one of the worst scourges to strike innocent people. Member nations must all support this defense strategy. I argue that establishing objectives and setting-up an Action Plan is not enough. Of course this does not mean that the strategy itself is the solution, more is needed than that. This strategy should include objectives to match the means available, and then it is very important to pursue the improvement of the preparedness of individual countries and of NATO as a whole to respond rapidly and effectively to the consequences of terrorist attacks (including WMD

attacks). Some of the specific issues written above refer to a better coordination of the alliance's efforts itself, the protection of individual countries, and then the specific issue to reach the consensus and maintain the unity of action within the organization.

Time is critical. NATO and its member nations face the very real threat of terrorism and countering this, in most circumstances, is crucial. To become more involved this fight is a necessity which has its roots in the nations' primary responsibility for defense of their own people and infrastructures. Therefore NATO should have a clear strategy and should increase its efforts and participation into field campaigns for combating terrorism. Consequently, the Alliance needs a strategy because it needs to be prepared to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups and their capabilities, whenever and wherever required, as the international situation requires and as the North Atlantic Council decides.

Coalition's Role for Combating Terrorism

It is well known that the United States has asked not only European countries, but others as well, to provide military support, intelligence, logistic support, and any other abilities which can be effectively used in the war against terrorism. As mentioned above, neither NATO nor other multinational organizations have provided support for combating terrorism in the field, at least, as much as United States expected. Consequently, the tendency is to conclude that multinational organizations are perceived as being less effective than individual countries because they require the unanimous consent of their members, and then a long process of decision making before involving their capabilities into action. As a result, in the last two major theatres of operations for combating the terrorist scourge, the United States has seen itself in the position of asking individual countries, to join the club and express openly their resolve and commitment to defeat the terrorists and bring back peace within free world.

Specifically, the role of a coalition is represented by the difficulties which are to be overcome in order to set it up. It is evident how frustrating it is to gather international support and then how difficult is to maintain its cohesion and unity of efforts. Another difficult piece is maintaining the coalition's members involved all the way to the final victory. It is not always possible to rely upon traditional allies, on a specific issue, if they do not share the same interests as the founder of the coalition.⁵⁴ In our specific case, while the campaign is to be run for a long time, is to be considered that success will be ensured by a continually and increasingly need of partners. A coalition consists of the role of each individual country. It doesn't matter how small or big the country is. Its participation brings into the organization the most important issue which contributes to increase its role.

A very important point is that the military is not the only pillar which supports coalition strength and roles. There are multiple and multilateral pillars and channels, such as: diplomacy, information, financial, economy, law, and intelligence which have grown and evolved in ways that changed the landscape of coalition. Therefore, even not offering substantial military capabilities by joining the coalition, but offering the availability to take part within the coalition, at least, through one of those domains, each country which cares and wants to fight against this scourge can offer much more sustainability, credibility and reliability to the coalition within the international arena. For example, European Union does not have military capabilities to offer the coalition in Iraq, but it has taken any other measures within diplomacy, justice and home land security. But this is not an easy issue; while counterterrorism is considered to be a very complex threat, building and leading a coalition is a much more complicated goal.

Normally, bilateral agreements are easy to be conducted and are more effective. While not only United States, but any other actor prefers this way of arrangements, the international realm for combating terrorism is imposing a different approach which has to be adopted by the main and/or secondary actors. Consequently, the bilateral approach will remain the number one priority through military and intelligence areas, but the multilateral approach must be utilized and increasingly developed in order to achieve robust capabilities within all areas mentioned above. Subsequently, a multilateral approach within regional and global arenas will enhance the ability of the coalition to identify and defeat individual and/or organized terrorists all over the world.

Analyzing Afghanistan and Iraq coalitions' contributors, it is easy to realize why some individual states, especially from Eastern Europe and Latin America participated. Some do not yet belong to an organization such as NATO, the European Union or any other institutions and were trying to prove by participating within these coalitions for combating terrorism their resolve and commitment to demonstrate their relevance and how necessary is the role of each country in defeating terrorism. On the other hand it is not so difficult to find out how easy some individual countries can withdraw from the team as a result of violent actions against innocent people back home, as happened in Spain. In addition, almost all the other countries which were supported by Spain have decided to withdraw their troops as well.

In conclusion, the role of a coalition does not consist only in legitimacy and/or number of powerful countries which join it. The role of coalition consists in its ability to exploit as much as possible the momentum of relevancy. Then, the coalition should provide useful alternatives for peace and stability in the region, which seems to appear an important benefit for attracting international support. Another point which has relevance for the coalition's role and dimension is the opportunity provided to some of the small and/or middle countries to consider their short-

term or perhaps long-term interests. The price paid by those countries through the participation within the coalition has already provided the chance to enter the club which considers democracy and freedom as supreme values of life. The long-term success of the coalition will depend on concerted cooperation either from individual countries or regional organizations and/or international institutions as well, having as a key factor the multilateral engagement of this scourge.

Conclusion

Terrorism itself and in conjunction with weapons of mass destruction proliferation and regional conflicts are considered to be the major current challenges which individual states, alliances and coalitions have to face in this heterogeneous global environment. Terrorism's threats flow from the construction of the expanded "caliphate" to the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially targeting United States and its allies. In accordance with the content of the Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (October 11, 2003), the international community has found out not only the strategic vision of al Qaeda's, but also its political goals. Consequently, we can assume that the nature of the threat is a global one and this makes it difficult to ensure effective countermeasures by the individuals, alliances and/or coalitions.

NATO envisages two ways of involving the alliance in the war against terrorism: "one where NATO is in the lead and one where NATO supports national authorities."⁵⁵ It is too soon to assume that these efforts will succeed or not. So far, under UN mandate, NATO has proved not only its relevance within engagement in Afghanistan, but also the UN influential contribution to the international consensus for combating terrorism. The necessity of a new strategy for combating terrorism is available not only for NATO, but for UN as well. Though the recent involvements of NATO and UN in Iraq could be considered to be not really effective, it is recommended that both organizations enhance their participation in the area. Time is critical and the involvement and a declaration of a clear strategy of these organizations are necessities which have their roots in the nations' primary responsibility for defense of their own people and infrastructures.

The role of coalitions in the war of combating terrorism comprises a very complex set of individual, regional and/or international interests. Each category retains primacy in a certain area of interests. As a result it is very important that the leading nation or organization of the coalition to have the power to maintain the balance within each approach. Finally, it is very important to assume that the individual, bilateral, and multilateral approach of this scourge can develop the counterterrorism capabilities over short and long-term objectives and would lead to

increase international cooperation against terrorism. Also, the involvement of organizations such as UN, NATO, and/or coalitions, and their increasingly efforts focused to defeat the terrorism will encourage other individuals or other organizations to involve themselves or increase their participation in activities to counter terrorism.

Endnotes

¹ We are referring here to: Korean War, Vietnam War, the continuously Israeli-Arabic Conflicts, then United Kingdom-Argentina conflict, Iran-Iraq War, Russian invasion into Afghanistan, the first Persian Gulf War (the first Coalition Intervention after The Fall of Berlin Wall), and not the least we want to mention to the interethnic and religious conflicts from Balkans.

² For example: in the Balkans, Sinai, Kuwait, South Korea, Angola, Mozambique, Georgia, Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.

³ Martin Van Creveld, "The Transformation of War Revisited," in *Non-State Threats and Future Wars*, Robert J. Bunker (ed. London: Frank Cass & Co., 2003), 3-14.

⁴ "When the Cold War Ended, we thought the world had changed. It had – but not in the way we thought. When the Cold War ended, our real challenge began. The United States had spent so much energy during those years trying to prevent the horror of global war that it forgot the dream of global peace." Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York, Berkley Books, 2004), 1.

⁵ For example: in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Colombia, in Congo, Kashmir, Liberia, Macedonia, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

⁶ In 1894 an Italian anarchist assassinated French President Sadi Carnot. In 1897 anarchists fatally stabbed Empress Elizabeth of Austria and killed Antonio Cánovas, the Spanish prime minister. In 1900 Umberto I, the Italian king, fell in yet another anarchist attack; in 1901 an American anarchist killed William McKinley, president of the United States. Terrorism became the leading preoccupation of politicians, police chiefs, journalists, and writers from Dostoevsky to Henry James, available from http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2003/09/07/the_president_and_the_assassin?mode=PF

⁷ For more details, see Fiona Adamson, *International terrorism, Non-State Actors and the Logic of Transnational Mobilization: A Perspective from International Relations* (Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation – CISAC), available from http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsg/gsg_activities/adamson.page

⁸ "The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure, enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between groups. In this environment, terrorists work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning, and executing attacks." George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 8

⁹ For more details, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, *The Historical and Political Conceptualization of the Concept of Terrorism* (November, 2002), available from <http://www.ssrc.org>

¹⁰ I did not restrict my research only to al-Qaeda, its horrible act from September 11, 2001 and to the events which have occurred after that. Unfortunately terrorism has a long history and very well known by governments and people as well.

¹¹ As it happened on September 11, 2001 in Washington but especially in New York when we were watching those horrible events live on many television news channels.

¹² For more details see how local governments have responded to such events as: Madrid – March 11, 2004; London – July 7, 2005; Amman – November 9, 2005.

¹³ Bush, 1.

¹⁴ There is no internationally accepted definition of terrorism. Not even the United Nations has been able to achieve consensus on this contentious issue. The old adage that “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist” goes to the root of the ongoing debate. Individual states, therefore, have been compelled to develop their own definitions for the purposes of enacting legislation to counter the threat.

¹⁵ “Attempts to understand terrorism in strategic terms highlight the unity of all strategic experience. Terrorism is different in its actions, and menace of actions, from regular military conquest or attrition of enemy’s military strength, but then guerilla warfare and nuclear deterrence also are different. But all these types of military conduct generate strategic effect. That effect can be produced upon the mind, the military muscle, or both, of the foe, but in either case there has to be a transition from the use of force, from violent acts and the threat thereof, to political consequences.” Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 296.

¹⁶ “It is an enduring conflict between those who want to see disconnected societies like Saddam’s Iraq join the global community defined by globalization’s Functioning Core and others who will do whatever it takes in terms of violence to prevent these societies from being – in their minds – assimilated into a “sacriligious global economic empire” lorded over by the United States. The most frightening form this violence takes in the current age is religious-inspired transnational terrorism, or what Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon dub “the age of sacred terror.” Over the long run, the real danger we face in this era is more than just the attempts by terrorists to drive the United States out of the Middle East; rather, it is their increasingly desperate attempts to drive the Middle East out of the world.” Barnett, 43.

¹⁷ “From its origins in the late 1960s, politically inspired or ideologically driven terrorist groups slowly ramped up their attacks worldwide, in no small measure because of systematic support from the Soviet bloc. When that aid disappeared in the late 1980s, global terrorism nosedived, leading many experts (including me) to surmise it would no longer constitute a significant security threat for the international community as a whole. What really happened in the 1990s is that many of these terrorists groups, cut off from Soviet material and ideological support, fundamentally reinvented themselves as religiously motivated terror movements.” Ibid., 44.

¹⁸ “Global economic integration means that a major terrorist attack anywhere in the developed world would have devastating consequences for the well-being of millions of people in the developing world. The World Bank estimates that the attacks of 11 September 2001 alone increased the number of people living in poverty by 10 million; the total cost to the world

economy probably exceeded 80 billion dollars. These numbers would be far surpassed by an incident involving nuclear terrorism.” Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Chance, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (United Nations, 2004), 14.

¹⁹ Barnett, 46.

²⁰ Bush, 29.

²¹ “Groups such as the PKK, the FLN, the IRA, Hamas, al Qaeda and other transnational organized non-state political actors fall somewhere on the continuum of transnational social movements, de-territorialized proto-states, and organized networks of terror and crime.” Fiona Adams.

²² “We understand that a world in which these values are embraced as standards, not exceptions, will be the best antidote to the spread of terrorism. This is the world we must build today.” Bush, 30.

²³ “The first tenet of the 4D strategy (Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend) calls for defeating terrorist organization of global reach through the direct or indirect use of diplomatic, economic, information, law enforcement, military, financial, intelligence, and other instruments of power”. Ibid., 15.

²⁴ Report, 48.

²⁵ Terrorism Prevention Branch, *Delivering Counter-terrorism Assistance* (United Nations Office of Drug and Crime), available from http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/terrorism/Brochure_GPT_April2005.pdf

²⁶ “Since 2002, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice have reiterated the mandate of the Terrorism Prevention Branch in providing technical assistance to counter terrorism. Upon the recommendation of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, in December 2004, adopted resolution 59/153, entitled “Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” In that resolution, the Assembly requested the Terrorism Prevention Branch “to intensify its efforts to provide technical assistance in preventing and combating terrorism, including training judicial and prosecutorial personnel, where appropriate, in the proper implementation of the universal anti-terrorism instruments.” The Secretary General, in his speech to the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid, stated that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime is experienced at providing technical assistance to states to develop and maintain an efficient criminal justice system capable of fighting terrorism.” Ibid., 2.

²⁷ Here I include the following organizations: “the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the International Monetary Fund, the African Union (AU), the International Organization of la Francophonie, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the League of Arab

States, Interpol, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Counter-Terrorism Working Group of the European Union (COTER), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Counter Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) of the G-8." The United Nations in Brief, *The Specialized Agencies*, available from www.un.org/Overview/brief6.html.

²⁸ "Exchange of expertise and information with other international and regional organizations and national institutions is emphasized. Moreover, where appropriate, the TPB works with other international organizations, as well as with regional and sub-regional organizations." *Terrorism*, available from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism.html>

²⁹ "One of diplomacy's key tasks is to arrange coalitions so that one's power and its reputation are multiplied through them." Colin L. Powell, "The craft of Diplomacy," *Wilson Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 3, (Summer 2004), 64.

³⁰ "The use of "soft power" (moral suasion) will be more and more influential in diplomatic and military arenas, even as "hard power" (weapons and military technology) grows more prominent in the American federal budget." Peter Schwartz, *Inevitable Surprise* (New York: Gotham Books, 2003), 3.

³¹ Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague, 22 Nov. 2002), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b021122e.htm>

³² NATO and the fight against terrorism, *Prague Summit – adapting to the threat of terrorism*, available from http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve_c.html

³³ "Some have argued that NATO is irrelevant in meeting the threat posed by terrorism because of its refusal to participate in the 2003 U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. This argument confuses the purpose of an alliance as a legitimate agreement among nations on collective defense for an illegitimate one on collective offensive action.... Washington considers terrorism and WMD proliferation, especially the lethal combination of the two, as the foremost threats facing not just the United States but the greater international community today. As disagreements over whether to go to war with Iraq show, however, different nations view the collective threat posed by the nexus of terrorism and WMD differently. Yet, many would agree that each poses a formidable current threat to international security and thus merits discussion here." Dingli Shen, *Can Alliances Combat Contemporary Threats?* available from http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/04spring_shen.pdf

³⁴ Here refer to: means of arrests, surveillance, intelligence gathering, special laws and so forth; taking added precautions in connection with air, maritime and land transport as well as public health - to guard against biological, chemical or nuclear attacks; tightening controls on bank transfers and investigating the impact of terrorist activities on the economy and on insurance companies in particular.

³⁵ "Success will not come by always acting alone, but through a powerful coalition of nations marinating a strong, united international front against terrorism...In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks we have reaped the rewards of the investments made in our major alliances during the past 50 years. These rewards are evident in NATO's unprecedented invocation of Article V of the NATO Treaty, Australia's invocation of Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty, and in the way both our NATO and ANZUS allies have matched words with deeds on

every front in the war against terrorism.” George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 20.

³⁶ “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, 4 April, 1949), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

³⁷ “On 12 September 2001, the Member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) condemned unconditionally the terrorist attacks on the United States of America on 11 September 2001, and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism. Building on this commitment, member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (hereinafter referred to as EAPC States) hereby endorse this Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism with a view to fulfilling their obligations under international law with respect to combating terrorism, mindful that the struggle against terrorism requires joint and comprehensive efforts of the international community, and resolved to contribute effectively to these efforts building on their successful co-operation to date in the EAPC framework.” Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b021122e.htm>

³⁸ “The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” Ibid.

³⁹ Here are included threats such as: regional conflicts, WMD proliferation as well as their means of delivery, and transnational threats such as terrorism. For more details see: NATO Summit, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Press Release NAC-S(99)65 – April 24, 1999), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

⁴⁰ NATO Topics, *Enlargement*, available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index>.

⁴¹ “The principal objectives of the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism are to:

- reconfirm the determination of EAPC States to create an environment unfavorable to the development and expansion of terrorism, building on their shared democratic values, and to assist each other and others in this endeavor;

- underscore the determination of EAPC States to act against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their willingness to co-operate in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks and dealing with their consequences;

- provide interested Partners with increased opportunities for contributing to and supporting, consistent with the specific character of their security and defense policies, NATO's efforts in the fight against terrorism;

- promote and facilitate co-operation among the EAPC States in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation, and practical programs under EAPC and the Partnership for Peace; upon request, provide assistance to EAPC States in dealing with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks, including on their economic and other critical infrastructure.” Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b021122e.htm>

⁴² NATO Summit, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept* (Press Release NAC-S(99)65 – April 24, 1999), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

⁴³ Partner Action Plan against Terrorism (Prague Summit 21-22 September, 2002), available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b021122e.htm>

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ NSC-68: A Report to the National Security Council, by Naval War College Review in National security Policy and Strategy, Volume 2 – Readings (Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College-Carlisle Barracks, Academic Year 2006), 257.

⁴⁷ NATO Topics, *NATO and the fight against terrorism*, available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/index>.

⁴⁸ Here I also refer to the lack of common agreement and different position regarding the alliance's involvement in the “central field to fight against terrorism – Iraq.”

⁴⁹ Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.

⁵⁰ NATO, International Military Staff, *NATO's military concept for defense against terrorism*, available from <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

⁵¹ For more details see: NATO Topics, *Defense Against Terrorism Program*, available from http://www.nato.int/issues/dat/in_practice.htm

⁵² NATO, International Military Staff, *NATO's military concept for defense against terrorism*, available from <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

⁵³ Then we have to consider the very specific interests which one or more members of alliance could have in the area where the campaign is to be conducted. Here we want to emphasize the Turkish position before and during the Operation Iraqi Freedom. This happened

not only because it is a Muslim country, but also because it has territorial problems with the Kurds.

⁵⁴ "Some key NATO members could not support Washington because they did not believe that Saddam posed an imminent threat. NATO's failure to act simply does not prove that the role of alliances will diminish as long as military action is taken for legitimate reasons. Given the abuse of a legitimate use of the policy of preemption, some NATO allies, such as France and Germany, strongly disagreed with the Bush administration on the war and on employing NATO for this purpose." Ibid, 168-169.

⁵⁵ Nora Bensahel, The Counter Terror Coalitions. *Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, available from <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1746/MR1746.pdf>, 26.

